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Application of New York Estates, Powers
& Trusts Law Section 3-3.2 To
Dispositions To Attesting Witnesses
The interested witness statute, section 3-3.2 of the New
York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL), provides that a
disposition to an attesting witness to a will is void if at the time
of execution and attestation there are not at least two other at-
testing witnesses who receive no disposition under the will. 1 The
disposition is also void, even though at the time of execution and
attestation there were at least two other attesting witnesses re-
ceiving no disposition, if the will cannot be proved without the
testimony of the witness to whom the disposition is made.2
The statute's direction that the disposition is void can be
1. N.Y. EST., POWESS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2(a)(1) (McKinney 1967). The text of
section 3-3.2 is as follows:
(a) An attesting witness to a will to whom a beneficial disposition or ap-
pointment of property is made is a competent witness and compellable to testify
respecting the execution of such will as if no such disposition or appointment had
been made, subject to the following:
(1) Any such disposition or appointment made to an attesting witness is
void unless there are, at the time of execution and attestation, at least two other
attesting witnesses to the will who receive no beneficial disposition or appoint-
ment thereunder.
(2) Subject to subparagraph (1), any such disposition or appointment to an
attesting witness is effective unless the will cannot be proved without the testi-
mony of such witness, in which case the disposition or appointment is void.
(3) Any attesting witness whose disposition is void hereunder, who would be
a distributee if the will were not established, is entitled to receive so much of his
intestate share as does not exceed the value of the disposition made to him in the
will, such share to be recovered as follows:
(A) In case the void disposition becomes part of the residuary disposition,
from the residuary disposition only.
(B) In case the void disposition passes in intestacy, ratibly [sic] from the
distributees who succeed to such interest. For this purpose, the void disposition
shall be distributed under 4-1.1 as though the attesting witness were not a
distributee.
(b) The provisions of this section apply to witnesses to a nuncupative will
authorized by 3-2.2.
2. Id. § 3-3.2(a)(2).
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given effect in two ways: by striking the disposition from the
will, or by treating the witness as having immediately prede-
ceased the testator. In most cases, either method of applying the
statute produces the same result. In two situations, however, the
different methods produce different results: if substitutionary
provisions have been made, either by statute or in the will, for
"lapsed" but not "void" dispositions; and if the statute applies
only to one beneficiary of a disposition in the form of a
cotenancy.
This comment explores the background of the interested
witness statute and finds that its legislative purpose was to pre-
serve the wishes of the testator as far as possible, while main-
taining safeguards against direct inducement to give fraudulent
testimony. Analyzing the statute's application, first, in conjunc-
tion with a substitutionary provision for lapsed dispositions and,
second, to a disposition in the form of a cotenancy, the comment
concludes that treating the witness as having immediately pre-
deceased the testator will best fulfill the legislative intent. Fi-
nally, the comment recommends that the legislature amend the
statute to specify this treatment and makes a drafting sugges-
tion to obviate confusion that could arise from a substitutionary
provision.
I. Background
A. Historical Evolution
Under the common law of England, a beneficiary' under a
will4 was disqualified from testifying as a witness' to that will.
3. The New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (hereinafter referred to as EPTL)
defines "testamentary beneficiary" as "a person in whose favor a disposition of property
is made by will." Id. § 1-2.17. This new term combines the separate common-law catego-
ries "devisee" and "legatee." A "devisee" is a person to whom land or other real property
is given by will; such a gift is called a "devise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 407-08 (5th ed.
1979). A "legatee" is one who receives a gift of personal property by will; such a gift is
called a "legacy" or a "bequest." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 145, 802, 808 (5th ed. 1979).
The separate common-law categories of gifts by will are consolidated in EPTL under the
term "disposition." N.Y. EsT., PowERs & TRUsTs LAW § 1-2.4 (McKinney 1967). To
avoid confusion, the EPTL terms are used throughout this comment.
4. EPTL gives "will" a comprehensive definition, which includes properly made oral
declarations and written instruments revocable during the lifetime of the testator which
dispose of property, direct how property shall not be disposed of, dispose of the testa-
tor's body or part thereof, exercise a power, appoint a fiduciary, or make any other provi-
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Since the witness would benefit by probate of the will, it was
feared that his interest would be an inducement to give fraudu-
lent testimony in favor of the will. 6 Barring such an interested
witness's testimony eliminated the possibility of fraud. If the
will could not be probated without his testimony, the will was
void.' In those cases in which fraud was absent, voiding the will
caused frustration of the testator's wishes and "cases frequently
arose where great hardship was worked.""
The earliest statutory attempts to solve this problem, both
in England and America, restored the witness's competency to
testify by depriving him of his interest under the will if the will
Sion for the administration of the testator's estate. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §
1-2.18 (McKinney 1967). Unless the context requires otherwise, the term "will" includes
a "codicil." Id. "A codicil is a supplement to a will, either adding to, taking from or
altering its provisions or confirming it in whole or in part by republication, but not to-
tally revoking such will." Id. § 1-2.1.
The common-law definition of "will" is "an instrument by which a person makes a
disposition of his property, to take effect after his decease." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1371 (3d ed. 1969). The differences between the two definitions are irrelevant to this
comment, since EPTL 3-3.2 applies only to wills which make "a beneficial disposition or
appointment of property" to a witness. N.Y. EST., PowERS & TRusTs LAW § 3-
3.2(a)(McKinney 1967).
5. To be valid, a will must be made as prescribed in EPTL 3-2.1 or EPTL 3-2.2.
EPTL 3-2.2 prescribes rules for nuncupative (unwritten) and holographic (written en-
tirely in the handwriting of the testator) wills. Holographic wills do not require attesta-
tion by witnesses and are therefore not affected by provisions regarding interested wit-
nesses. N.Y. EST., PoWEs & TRUsTS LAW § 3-3.2, revisers' note 3, at 314 (McKinney
1967). The making of a nuncupative will and its provisions must be clearly established
by at least two witnesses. Id. § 3-2.2(a)(1). EPTL 3-2.1, which prescribes the rules for all
other wills, requires that at least two witnesses attest that the testator's signature was
affixed or acknowledged in their presence and sign at the end of the will. Id. § 3-
2.1(a)(4). Such witnesses are traditionally called "subscribing witnesses," from the act of
signing at the end of the instrument (Latin: sub, under; scribere, to write), BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1596 (4th ed. 1968); or "attesting witnesses," from the act of attesting that
the signer has witnessed the execution of the instrument, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 117
(5th ed. 1979). EPTL uses the term "attesting witness." See, e.g., N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1 (McKinney 1967).
6. In re Walters, 285 N.Y. 158, 162, 33 N.E.2d 72, 74, remittitur amended, 285 N.Y.
412, 35 N.E.2d 19 (1941).
7. In re Dwyer, 192 A.D. 72, 76, 182 N.Y.S. 64, 66 (4th Dep't 1920); In re Smith, 165
Misc. 36, 38, 300 N.Y.S. 1057, 1059 (Sur. Ct. Westhester County), aff'd, 253 A.D. 731,
300 N.Y.S. 919 (2d Dep't 1937). At common law, proof of a will required the testimony of
two witnesses. If at least two witnesses who were not beneficiaries were available to tes-
tify, the will could still be probated despite the disqualification of the interested witness;
if, however, the interested witness was one of only two available witnesses, his disqualifi-
cation would cause the will to fail.
8. In re Dwyer, 192 A.D. 72, 76, 182 N.Y.S. 64, 66 (4th Dep't 1920).
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could not be proved without his testimony.9 These statutes pre-
served the wishes of the testator by allowing proof of the will
and implementation of the testamentary dispositions contained
therein, except the disposition to the witness. The statutes also
eliminated the inducement for the witness to testify fraudu-
lently in favor of the will by denying him any direct benefit
under the will.
These statutes, however, created a new inducement to tes-
tify fraudulently against the will if the interested witness was
also a distributee 0 of the testator: if the will was proved, the
witness was deprived of his interest and would get nothing; but
if the will failed and the decedent died intestate,11 the witness
received his intestate share.1 2 Moreover, the statutes left the in-
terested witness/distributee in a worse position than he had
9. Id. There is some ambiguity as to the required "necessity" of the testimony of the
interested witness. In In re Walters, 285 N.Y. 158, 33 N.E.2d 72, remittitur amended,
285 N.Y. 412, 35 N.E.2d 19 (1941), both witnesses were to share in a bequest of the
testator's business. One witness had left the state at the time of probate in order to avoid
testifying. Id. at 161, 33 N.E.2d at 73. The Surrogate's Court had dispensed with the
testimony of the absent witness under the authority of § 142 of the Surrogate's Court
Act, now Surrogate's Court Procedure Act (hereinafter referred to as SCPA) § 1405, and
proved the will on the testimony of the remaining witness. Id. at 161-62, 33 N.E.2d at 73-
74. The court held that "[s]ince the will was in fact probated without the testimony" of
the absent witness, her testimony was not required and the disposition to her therefore
not void. Id. at 162, 33 N.E.2d at 74. This case would be decided differently now, since
EPTL 3-3.2(a)(1) makes clear that any disposition to a witness is void unless there were
at least two other disinterested witnesses at the time of execution. If there were two such
disinterested witnesses at the time of execution, but both are not available to testify at
probate, the Surrogate's Court could still invoke SCPA § 1405 to dispense with the testi-
mony of an absent interested witness. For the purposes of this comment, it will be as-
sumed that the testimony of the interested witness is "necessary" to prove the will.
10. EPTL defines "distributee" as "a person entitled to take or share in the prop-
erty of a decedent under the statutes governing descent and distribution." N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.5 (McKinney 1967). At common law such persons were also
called "heirs," "heirs at law," or "next of kin." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 361 (3d ed.
1969). These terms are now replaced by "distributee." N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 2-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
11. If the invalid will had contained the testator's sole attempt to revoke an earlier
valid will, the earlier will may now be probated. If all earlier wills also fail, or if none
exist, the decedent is said to die intestate, and the estate passes under the statutes gov-
erning descent and distribution.
12. The part of an intestate estate which each distributee receives is called his "dis-
tributive share" at common law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (5th ed. 1979). EPTL
replaces this term with "intestate share." See, e.g., N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§
3-3.2(a)(3), 5-1.1(c)(2)(B) (McKinney 1967).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/13
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been under the common-law rule: under the statute, the will
would be probated, and the interested witness/distributee would
receive nothing; under the common law, either the will would be
probated without his testimony, and he would receive his dispo-
sition under the will, or if the will could not be probated without
his testimony, he would receive his intestate share.' 3 The New
York legislature acted to eliminate both this new inducement to
testify against the will and the perceived inequity to the inter-
ested witness/distributee. A statute," effective January 1, 1830,
preserved for the witness the amount of the lesser of the disposi-
tion to him or his intestate share.'5
This statutory pattern, that an interested witness is compe-
tent to testify but that the disposition to him is limited by the
amount of his intestate share or destroyed if he is not a distribu-
tee, was embodied in section 27 of the Decedent Estate Law16
and now forms section 3-3.2 of EPTL.17 The statute directs that
13. In re Dwyer, 192 A.D. 72, 76, 182 N.Y.S. 64, 66 (4th Dep't 1920).
14. N.Y.R.S. pt. 2, chap. 6, tit. 1, art. 3, § 51.
15. In re Dwyer, 192 A.D. 72, 76, 182 N.Y.S. 64, 66 (4th Dep't 1920).
16. N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW, 1909 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 18, § 27 (current version at N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2 (McKinney 1967)).
17. For the text of EPTL 3-3.2, see note 1 supra. Subparagraph (a)(3) of EPTL 3-
3.2, which provides that an interested witness/distributee "is entitled to receive so much
of his intestate share as does not exceed the value of the disposition made to him in the
will," also specifies that "such share" be recovered from the residuary disposition if the
void disposition becomes part of the residue, or ratably from the distributees if the void
disposition passes in intestacy. N.Y. EsT., Powras & TRusTS LAW § 3-3.2(a)(3) (McKin-
ney 1967.) Thus, although what the witness receives is technically his intestate share
rather than the void disposition, this "share" is taken from the ultimate recipients of the
void disposition. For convenience, this process is often telescoped and described as sav-
ing the disposition.
No provision is made in EPTL 3-3.2(a)(3) for a void disposition which passes by a
nonresiduary substitutionary disposition; in such cases, the legislative intent of the sec-
tion clearly requires recovery from any applicable substitutionary disposition.
A more difficult problem may arise if the void disposition is in the form of a coten-
ancy between the interested witnesa/distributee and a nonwitness. For a discussion of
cotenancies, see notes 67-91 and accompanying text infra. If the value of the witness's
intestate share is equal to or greater than the value of his void interest in the cotenancy,
EPTL 3-3.2(a)(3) preserves the entire interest, and no difficulty arises. If the value of the
intestate share is less than that of the interest in the cotenancy, however, EPTL 3-
3.2(a)(3) requires that the value of the witness's interest be reduced to the value of the
intestate share. This reduction in value is possible in a tenancy in common, in which the
interests of the cotenants may be unequal, but is impossible in a joint tenancy or a ten-
ancy by the entirety, in which the cotenants own the one interest together and must,
therefore, be equal. In these latter situations, EPTL 3-3.2(a)(3) may require that the
5
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"[a]ny such disposition or appointment made to an attesting
witness is void."18 The former statutes, including the Decedent
Estate Law, had declared that the "devise, legacy, interest or ap-
pointment shall be void, so far only as concerns such witness, or
any claiming under him."10 The reports of the Bennett Commis-
sion,20 which drafted the present statute after six years of the
most thorough analysis and consideration, did not discuss this
change of wording. Neither is it mentioned in the official Revis-
ers' Notes. 21 Hence, one can assume that the change merely re-'
flects a drafting economy and was not intended to change the
meaning of the earlier form.'
cotenancy be converted to a tenancy in common in order to permit reduction of the
witness's interest. Because of the complexity of applying EPTL 3-3.2(a)(3) to joint ten-
ancies and tenancies by the entirety, the sections of this comment dealing with such
tenancies assume that the interested witness is not a distributee.
18. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2(a)(1) (McKinney 1967).
19. N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW, 1909 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 18, § 27 (current version at N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2 (McKinney 1967)).
20. FIRST THROUGH SIXTH AND FINAL REPORTS OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION
ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, N.Y. LEG-
ISLATIVE Doc. 1962, no. 19; 1963, no. 19; 1964, no. 19; 1965, no. 19; 1966, no. 19; 1967, no.
19.
21. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2, revisers' notes at 314 (McKinney
1967).
22. The change of wording could be relevant in two contexts in this comment: (1)
application of the anti-lapse statute to dispositions made to a witness who is an issue or
sibling of the testator, see notes 51-57 and accompanying text infra; and (2) dispositions
in the form of cotenancies, see notes 67-139 and accompanying text infra.
In the first instance, if the current version of the interested witness statute preserves
the meaning of the earlier form, one could argue that the proposed application of the
anti-lapse statute to dispositions made to a witness who is an issue or sibling of the
testator is prohibited. The anti-lapse statute would pass such dispositions to the issue of
such witness by virtue of their relation to the witness, making them, under this argu-
ment, persons "claiming under" the witness. Since section 27 of the Decedent Estate
Law (hereinafter referred to as DEL) declared the disposition void "as concerns such
witness, or any claiming under him," the attempted application of the anti-lapse statute
would be void as well. The answer to this argument is that the issue of such witness are
not claiming under him; their claim is based on independent rights arising by statutory
grant. Note in particular that the anti-lapse statute vests the disposition in the issue of
the witness without regard to their status as distributees, beneficiaries, or assigns of the
witness; only these latter classes would be "claiming under" the witness. Thus, even if, as
argued, the current statute retains the meaning of the former version, it does not prevent
application of the anti-lapse statute by the method proposed in this comment. See notes
51-57 and accompanying text infra. If the current statute is read without reference to the
former version, this conclusion is even more obvious, since only a disposition "to an at-
testing witness" is rendered void by EPTL 3-3.2.
In the second instance, the argument would assume that the legislature intended the
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/13
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B. Legislative Purpose
The succession of statutes modifying the common-law rule2 3
attempted to maintain the safeguards against fraud while pre-
serving the wishes of the testator. The common-law rule, by dis-
qualifying the testimony of the interested witness, had elimi-
nated the possibility that a witness's personal interest in the will
would induce him to testify fraudulently for or against the will;
but the common-law rule also frustrated the wishes of the testa-
tor if the will could not be probated without the testimony of
that witness.2 4 The current statutory provisions preserve the pri-
mary intent of the testator by allowing all witnesses to testify,
while at the same time guarding against fraud by voiding or
modifying those provisions of the will which create the witness's
personal interest.2 '
The effect of the interested witness statute has been to en-
hance protection of the testator's wishes, while weakening the
safeguards against fraud. The instrument will not be denied pro-
bate because of an interested witness, who is now competent and
"compellable to testify";2' thus, the basic testamentary scheme
will be preserved. The testator's wishes are only frustrated with
respect to the disposition to the witness, which is destroyed be-
cause this disposition might induce fraudulent testimony in
favor of the will. In this respect the statute provides as full a
change of wording to change the meaning of the statute as regards dispositions in the
form of cotenancies. The earlier version in DEL § 27 clearly protected the co-beneficiary
who was not a witness, since it voided the disposition "so far only as concerns such
witness, or any claiming under him." Since EPTL 3-3.2 omits this phrase, one could
argue that the direction that "[a]ny such disposition or appointment made to an attest-
ing witness is void" applies to the entire legacy and voids the interest of the nonwitness
co-beneficiary as well as that of the witness. Nothing in the legislative history of the
current statute, however, especially in the detailed and comprehensive reports of the
Bennett Commission, see note 20 supra, suggests that so major a change was intended.
More likely, the legislature intended that the new phrase "disposition . . . made to an
attesting witness" encompass only that part of the disposition which "concerns such wit-
ness." Neither In re Flynn, 68 Misc. 2d 1087, 329 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sur. Ct. Westchester
County 1972), the only case to consider application of EPTL 3-3.2 to cotenancies, nor
the criticism of that case, raised this point or suggested that the interest of the nonwit-
ness co-beneficiary should be void. See note 131 infra.
23. See notes 9-17 and accompanying text supra.
24. In re Dwyer, 191 A.D. 72, 76, 182 N.Y.S. 64, 66 (4th Dep't 1920).
25. N.Y. EsT., PowESs & ThusTs LAw § 3-3.2 (McKinney 1967).
26. Id. § 3-3.2(a).
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protection against fraud as did the common-law rule. The pro-
tection against the possibility that an interested witness/distrib-
utee will testify fraudulently against the will, however, is not as
strong under the statute as it was under the common-law rule. 7
The common-law rule had eliminated the danger that an in-
terested witness/distributee would testify fraudulently against
the will by disqualifying the witness's testimony. The statute at-
tempts to prevent such fraudulent testimony against the will by
allowing an interested witness/distributee to receive the lesser of
the disposition or his intestate share. If the disposition is greater
than the, intestate share, the witness will receive the same
amount whether the will is proved or not and thus has no motive
to testify fraudulently for or against the will. But if the disposi-
tion is smaller than the intestate share, the witness will receive
less if the will is proved than if it fails, and the possibility of
fraud against the will remains. Thus, under the statute, an inter-
ested witness may be induced to testify fraudulently against the
will in certain circumstances which would not have been possible
under the common-law rule.
The statute also makes no attempt to go beyond the com-
mon-law rule to guard against fraud which may be motivated by
interests not personal to the witness. A gift to the witness's
spouse or issue may provide as strong an inducement to testify
fraudulently in favor of the will as a gift to the witness himself.
Similarly, a witness whose spouse or issue is a distributee of the
testator may have almost the same motive to testify fraudulently
against the will as a witness who is himself a distributee. The
legislature may have concluded that protecting against such in-
direct interests would complicate the statute unduly.28 In many
27. In practice, it is rare that one who acts as an attesting witness will testify against
the will. Interview with Professor Philip B. Blank, Pace University School of Law, for-
merly Law Assistant/Referee in the Surrogate's Court, Westchester County, N.Y., in
White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 15, 1980). Nevertheless such testimony is possible. Moreover,
the witness may be induced to testify in favor of the will in such an unconvincing way
that the effect is to discredit the will.
28. Additional examples in which indirect interests might serve as inducements to
fraudulent testimony against the will include a witness who would have received a dispo-
sition under a prior will; a witness whose spouse or issue would have received such a
disposition; and a witness to a codicil which reduces the value of dispositions to the
witness or his spouse or issue under the will, Examples in which indirect interests might
serve as inducements to fraudulent testimony in favor of the will include a witness to a
[Vol. 1:473
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cases, protection against such indirect interests would expand
the reach of the statute to most of the persons best qualified and
most likely to serve as attesting witnesses of home-drawn wills.
In any event, the legislature did not choose to protect against all
possible motives for fraudulent testimony.
Although some commentators focus on the protection
against fraudulent testimony,"' the preceding analysis of the
statutory modifications of the common-law rule shows that the
primary legislative purpose was to "remedy the evils and hard-
ships"30 of frustrating the testator's wishes. The protection
against fraud has not been expanded"1 and, indeed, has been
sacrificed in part 2 to preserve as much of the testamentary
scheme as possible.
This underlying legislative purpose should be the guide in
situations in which the appropriate method of application is not
clearly indicated by the statutory scheme. In particular, the stat-
ute is not punitive but remedial, and therefore its words may be
given a liberal construction to further the legislative purpose."
II. Uncertainties in Applying the Statute
A. The Relationship Between the Statute and Substitutionary
codicil which increases the value of dispositions to the witness's spouse or issue. In addi-
tion, the ties of friendship are often as close as those of blood and could also create
indirect inducements for a witness to testify fraudulently. The complications which
would result from attempting to protect against these indirect interests could easily over-
whelm the legislative process.
29. See, e.g., In re Fracht, 94 Misc. 2d 664, 667, 405 N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (Sur. Ct.
Bronx County 1978).
30. In re Dwyer, 192 A.D. 72, 76, 182 N.Y.S. 64, 66 (4th Dep't 1920).
31. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
32. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
33. See, e.g., Americafi Historical Soc'y v. Glenn, 248 N.Y. 445, 451, 162 N.E. 481,
482-83 (1928); Archer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 218 N.Y. 18,
25, 112 N.E. 433, 436 (1916); Hudler v. Golden, 36 N.Y. 446, 447 (1867); Gavin v. Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 335, 336, 292 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).
The remedial purpose of EPTL 3-3.2 was to lessen the frustration of testators'
wishes which resulted under the common-law rule and early statutes. A liberal construc-
tion of EPTL 3-3.2, therefore, would seek to preserve dispositions to interested witnesses
if this could be done without sacrificing the safeguards against fraud. If the disposition
could not be saved, a liberal construction would seek to pass it to those alternate benefi-
ciaries the testator would likely have chosen, had he contemplated the contingency.
9
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Provisions for Lapsed Dispositions
1. The meaning of "Void" and "Lapsed"
EPTL 3-3.2 states that under certain specified circum-
stances a disposition to an attesting witness is "void. ' ' "
EPTL 3-3.3,85 and many substitutionary clauses in wills, refer to
dispositions which have "lapsed." Applicability of provisions for
lapsed dispositions to the interested witness situation depends
on the relationship between the terms "void" and "lapsed."
Strictly speaking, a lapsed disposition is one "which is good
at the date [of execution] of the will, but afterward fails by rea-
son of the occurrence of some event."3 6 A disposition would
lapse, for example, when a beneficiary, who was alive when the
will was made, dies before the testator.37 A void disposition, on
the other hand, is one "which was ineffective from the date [of
execution] of the will,"" for example, when a beneficiary was
dead at the time the will was made.89 If these narrow definitions
are used in interpreting EPTL, a disposition to an interested
witness which is void under EPTL 3-3.2 is a nullity" and must
be struck from the will as if it had never existed. The gift would
then pass by an applicable substitutionary disposition or fall
into the estate to pass by residuary gift or in intestacy.41 A sub-
stitutionary provision triggered by a "lapse" could not be ap-
plied to a "void" disposition because of the clear distinction be-
tween the two.
These technical definitions are not widely followed, how-
34. For the text of EPTL 3-3.2, see note 1 supra.
35. EPTL 3-3.3, the anti-lapse statute, provides that a testamentary disposition to
an issue or sibling of the testator who dies during the lifetime of the testator does not
lapse but passes to the surviving issue of such predeceasing beneficiary, unless the will
provides otherwise. N.Y. EsT., Powxsm & ThUSTs LAW § 3-3.; (McKinney 1967). For the
text of EPTL 3-3.3, see note 48 infra.
36. 80 Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 1661 (1975).
37. See, e.g., In re King, 200 N.Y. 189, 193, 93 N.E. 484, 485 (1910); In re Estate of
Sorensen, 28 A.D.2d 534, 535, 279 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (2d Dep't 1967); In re Estate of
Anderson, 26 Misc. 2d 468, 470, 209 N.Y.S.2d 188, 190 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
38. 80 Am. Jtm. 2d Wills § 1661 (1975).
39. Id.
40. BALLENINE's LAW DICTIONARY 1348 (3d ed. 1969).
41. See 65 N.Y. Jim. Wills § 817 (1969); 6 WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY Wills § 13.03 (1978). See also note 43 and accompanying text infra.
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ever, and the two terms are often used interchangeably."2 If the
distinction between "void" and "lapsed" is blurred, the statu-
tory provisions could be effectuated by treating the interested
witness as if he had immediately predeceased the testator,
thereby causing the disposition to lapse. In most situations,
treating the witness as having immediately predeceased the tes-
tator would produce the same effect as striking out the disposi-
tion: a lapsed gift, like a void gift, passes by an applicable sub-
stitutionary disposition or falls into the estate to pass by
residuary gift or in intestacy.4" The result would be different
only when a substitutionary provision had been made in the will
or by statute for "lapsed" dispositions. Eliminating the distinc-
tion between "void" and "lapsed" would make such substitu-
tionary provisions applicable to the disposition to the interested
witness.
Resolution of this conflict between the mutually exclusive
and the interchangeable definitions of "void" and "lapsed" must
come from the usage of the terms in EPTL. Neither term is de-
42. See, e.g., In re Wells, 113 N.Y. 396, 400, 21 N.E. 137, 138 (1889). The term
"lapse" is frequently used when the beneficiary has died before the date of execution. 80
Am. JurL 2d Wills § 1661 (1975). See, e.g., In re Tamargo, 220 N.Y. 225, 232, 115 N.E.
462, 464 (1917). In general, "[tihe courts show little inclination to distinguish" between
the two categories. 65 N.Y. JuR. Wills § 817 (1969). Most legal dictionaries are more
concerned with the contrast between "void" and "voidable" than with that between
"void" and "lapsed." See, e.g., BALLZN'n's LAW DICTIONARY 709, 1348 (3d ed. 1969);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1022-23, 1745 (4th ed. 1968); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792,
1411 (5th ed. 1979); BouvixR's LAw DICTIONARY 1861-62, 3406-07 (3d ed. 1914); Jowrrr's
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 1065, 1869 (2d ed. 1977); STRou's JUDICIAL DICTIONARY
1489-91, 2951-56 (4th ed. 1971-74). WznsTzr's THUMD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1971) actually lists "void" as a definition of "lapsed." Id. at 1272.
43. See, e.g., In re Estate of Bonnet, 113 N.Y. 522, 524, 21 N.E. 139, 140 (1889)
("lapsed or void legacy will be carried by a general gift of the residuum"); Cruikshank v.
Home for the Friendless, 113 N.Y. 337, 355, 21 N.E. 64, 66 (1889) ("lapsed devise fell
into the residue"); In re Estate of Simons, 16 Misc. 2d 352, 353-54, 182 N.Y.S.2d 1005,
1007 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1958) (gift of one half of the remainder to the testator's son
and grandson "and to their lawful issue, if any," was designed "to provide for a substitu-
tional gift to the issue of the named legatees to take effect in the event of the death of
either of them leaving such issue him surviving"; since the son died without issue, his
share of the gift "fails and becomes part of the residuary estate"); In re Estate of Parker,
15 Misc. 2d 162, 164, 181 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713-14 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1958) ("legacy
lapsed . . . the share . . . passes as intestate property"); In re Estate of Epstein, 14
Misc. 2d 946, 947, 179 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1958) ("legacy lapsed and
must be distributed as in intestacy"). See also 64 N.Y. JuR. Wills § 717 (1969); 6 WAR-
REN'S WEED Nzw YORK LAw OF RKAL PROPERTY Wills § 13.03 (1978).
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fined, but analysis of both EPTL 3-3.2 and EPTL 3-3.3 raises a
strong implication that the legislature did not intend to draw a
distinction between "void" and "lapsed."
EPTL 3-3.2(a)(1) applies when there are not two disinter-
ested witnesses at the time of execution;" such dispositions are
ineffective from the date of execution and come within the nar-
row definition of "void."' " EPTL 3-3.2(a)(2) applies when there
were two disinterested witnesses in addition to the interested
witness, but they are unavailable at the time of probate, and the
will cannot be proved without the testimony of the interested
witness;4 6 such dispositions are good initially but fail afterward
and therefore come within the narrow definition of "lapsed.'4 7
Since EPTL 3-3.2 terms "void" those dispositions which can be
characterized as "lapsed" and also those which are clearly void,
the legislature cannot have intended a rigid distinction between
the two terms.
EPTL 3-3.3, the anti-lapse statute, provides that a disposi-
tion to an issue, brother or sister of the testator who dies during
the lifetime of the testator "does not lapse."' 8 The statute does
not expressly affect void dispositions. Subsection (a)(2) extends
the application of this anti-lapse rule to dispositions made to a
44. N.Y. EST., PowmRS & ThusTs LAw § 3-3.2(a)(1) (McKinney 1967). For the text
of EPTL 3-3.2, see note 1 supra.
45. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
46. N.Y. EST., Powmts & ThusTs LAw § 3-3.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967). For the text
of EPTL 3-3.2, see note 1 supra.
47. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
48. N.Y. EST., PowERS & ThusTs LAw § 3-3.3 (McKinney 1967). The text of EPTL
3-3.3 is as follows:
(a) Unless the will provides otherwise:
(1) Whenever a testamentary disposition is made to the issue or to a brother
or sister of the testator, and such beneficiary dies during the lifetime of the testa-
tor leaving issue surviving such testator, such disposition does not lapse but vests
in such surviving issue, per stirpes.
(2) The provisions of subparagraph (1) apply to a disposition made to issue,
brothers or sisters as a class as if the disposition were made to the beneficiaries by
their individual names, except that no benefit shall be conferred hereunder upon
the surviving issue of an ancestor who died before the execution of the will in
which the disposition to the class was made.
(b) As used in this section, the terms "issue," "surviving issue" and "issue
surviving" include adopted children and illegitimate children; for this purpose, an
illegitimate is the child of his mother and is the child of his father if he is entitled
to inherit from his father under 4-1.2.
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testator's issue or siblings as a class, but specifically excludes the
issue of class beneficiaries who died before the execution of the
will from the benefit of this class anti-lapse rule.4 9 This exclu-
sion would not have been necessary had the legislature intended
to draw a distinction between "void" and "lapsed," since dispo-
sitions to named or class beneficiaries who had died before exe-
cution of the will are "void" under the narrow definition.50
Therefore, the exclusion from the anti-lapse rule of class benefi-
ciaries who had died before execution of the will is excess verbi-
age unless the terms "void" and "lapsed" are interchangeable.
The fact that the legislature felt the exclusion to be necessary in
EPTL 3-3.3 again implies that the terms were seen as inter-
changeable and not mutually exclusive.
The conclusion that the legislature did not intend a rigid
distinction between "void" and "lapsed" permits, but does not
require, application of EPTL 3-3.2 by treating the interested
witness as if he had immediately predeceased the testator in-
stead of by striking the disposition from the will. That method
of application should be used which best fulfills the legislative
purpose. The subsections immediately following analyze two ar-
eas in which the two methods of application produce different
results: statutory provisions for certain lapsed dispositions; and
testamentary provisions relating to lapsed dispositions.
2. The Anti-Lapse Statute
EPTL 3-3.3, the anti-lapse statute, provides that a disposi-
tion to an issue, brother or sister of the testator who dies during
the lifetime of the testator does not lapse but passes to the sur-
viving issue of such predeceasing beneficiary, unless the will pro-
vides otherwise. 1 On its face, this statute does not apply to a
49. Since this exclusion is not stated in connection with dispositions to named issue,
brothers or sisters of the testator, the statute apparently applies to such dispositions
even if the named beneficiary had died before execution of the will, as long as the named
beneficiary's death occurred "during the lifetime of the testator." N.Y. EsT., Powas &
TRusTs LAW § 3-3.3, commentary at 79 (McKinney Supp. 1980). That these dispositions,
which are technically "void," are made effective by a statute which prevents their
"lapse" again shows that the legislature used the two terms interchangeably.
50. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
51. N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRusTs LAW § 3-3.3 (McKinney 1967). For the text of
EPTL 3-3.3, see note 48 supra.
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disposition to an attesting witness who is also an issue or sibling
of the testator which is declared "void" by EPTL 3-3.2; the ben-
eficiary is not dead, and the disposition has not lapsed. If EPTL
3-3.2 is applied by striking the disposition from the will, the
anti-lapse statute clearly does not apply. But if EPTL 3-3.2 is
applied by treating the witness as having immediately prede-
ceased the testator, then the situation falls within the scope of
the anti-lapse statute, and application of the anti-lapse statute
will cause the disposition to pass to the witness's issue.52 The
choice of the better method of applying EPTL 3-3.2 in this situ-
ation thus depends on whether application of the anti-lapse stat-
ute to such witnesses' dispositions furthers the legislative pur-
pose of the interested witness statute.
Treating the witness as having immediately predeceased the
testator, and thereby applying the anti-lapse statute to pass the
void disposition to the issue of the witness, would provide less
protection against fraud than would striking out the disposition;
the witness would still have an indirect inducement, the interest
of his issue, to testify fraudulently. Neither the common law nor
the interested witness statutes, however, have ever attempted to
protect against interests not personal to the witness." The nu-
merous existing qualifications on the interested witness statute's
protection against fraud weaken the argument that application
of the anti-lapse statute to an interested witness would violate
the legislative purpose of EPTL 3-3.2. If the disposition had
been made directly to the issue of the witness, EPTL 3-3.2
clearly would not apply; the disposition would be good. When a
disposition is made to the witness, application of the anti-lapse
statute to pass the disposition to his issue produces the same
practical result as if the disposition had been made to the issue
directly. Therefore, application of EPTL 3-3.3 seems compatible
with the minimum protection against fraud required by EPTL
3-3.2.
Moreover, application of the anti-lapse statute to pass the
52. One could argue that this is not a literal reading of EPTL 3-3.3 since the witness
has not actually died. If it is determined that EPTL 3-3.2 shall be applied by treating
the witness as having immediately predeceased the testator, there is a legal fiction, for
the purpose of the disposition to the witness, that he has died during the lifetime of the
testator.
53. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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disposition to the witness's issue would further the primary leg-
islative purpose of preserving the testator's wishes as far as pos-
sible s.5  The anti-lapse statute is based on a legislative determi-
nation that when a disposition to an issue, brother or sister of
the testator fails, and there is no substitutionary disposition, the
testator would prefer that the disposition pass to such benefi-
ciary's issue rather than fall into the estate and pass in the resi-
due or in intestacy.55 The same family ties that support this im-
plied testamentary intent when the beneficiary predeceases the
testator also provide support when the disposition fails because
the beneficiary was an attesting witness.5 Finally, if the void
disposition is the residue of the estate, application of the anti-
lapse statute would satisfy the rule of testamentary construction
to avoid intestacy whenever possible. 7
3. Substitutionary Testamentary Provisions
When the testator has made a substitutionary disposition in
the event that the beneficiary predeceases him, there is a strong
implication that the testator would have wished this to apply
when the primary disposition is declared void by EPTL 3-3.2."
54. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
55. See, e.g., In re Neydorff, 193 A.D. 531, 533, 184 N.Y.S. 551, 553 (3d Dep't 1920);
In re Estate of Howes, 35 Misc. 2d 109, 110, 229 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1962).
56. In the case of a home-drawn will, that the testator himself chose the beneficiary
as an attesting witness usually implies a close personal tie between them.
57. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nurse, 35 N.Y.2d 381, 388, 362 N.Y.S.2d 441, 445, 321
N.E.2d 537, 540 (1974); Lamb v. Lamb, 131 N.Y. 227, 234, 30 N.E.2d 133, 134 (1892); In
re Will of Birdsell, 271 A.D. 90, 95, 63 N.Y.S.2d 146, 151 (3d Dep't 1946), affd, 296 N.Y.
840, 72 N.E.2d 26 (1947).
58. In re Baumann's Will, 97 N.Y.S.2d 478, 485 (Sur. Ct. Broome County 1950).
Although the court accepted this implied testamentary intent, it held that applying a
substitutionary disposition worded in terms of the beneficiary's death to a witness's void
disposition would be, in effect, rewriting the will. This the court refused to do, noting
that "there is no stronger principle in the law of wills than that courts cannot make or
remake decedents' wills." Id. The disposition in question was part of the residue; the
result may have been influenced by the strong common-law rule of "no residue of a resi-
due," which has since been changed by EPTL 3-3.4. In any case, this comment's argu-
ment does not involve rewriting the will in order to include a void disposition within a
provision for lapsed dispositions. This comment suggests that EPTL 3-3.2 be applied by
treating the witness as having immediately predeceased the testator. If one decides to
apply the statute in this way, the disposition to the witness comes within the natural
meaning of a substitutionary disposition for beneficiaries who have died. The Baumann
15
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The substitutionary disposition shows an actual intent to prefer
the substitutionary beneficiary to the residuary beneficiaries or
the distributees upon the only contingency the testator contem-
plated. One may fairly imply this same intent when the disposi-
tion fails for another reason not involving wrongdoing by the
beneficiary.' 9 Application of the interested witness statute by
treating the witness as having immediately predeceased the tes-
tator would bring the disposition within the scope of the substi-
tutionary disposition. Striking the disposition as void would
cause the gift to fall back into the estate, since the condition of
the substitutionary disposition that the beneficiary predecease
the testator would not have been met. Thus the primary purpose
of the statute, to preserve the testator's wishes as far as possi-
ble,60 is better fulfilled by treating the witness as having imme-
diately predeceased the testator.
The arguments concerning the protection against fraud dis-
cussed in the context of the anti-lapse statute are also applicable
to such substitutionary dispositions if the substitutionary bene-
ficiary is the spouse or an issue of the witness. 1 The practical
effect of treating the witness as having immediately predeceased
the testator is to pass the gift to the spouse or issue by the sub-
stitutionary disposition; this destroys the witness's personal in-
terest and is compatible with the minimum protection against
fraud required by EPTL 3-3.2. If the substitutionary beneficiary
is not the spouse or an issue of the primary beneficiary, the sec-
ondary purpose of protection against an indirect inducement to
fraud is irrelevant, and the justification for treating the witness
as having immediately predeceased the testator is even stronger.
4. Conclusion Regarding "Void" and "Lapsed"
Analysis of the usage of "void" and "lapsed" in EPTL indi-
cates that the legislature did not intend to draw a distinction
court did not consider this approach.
59. The implied testamentary intent that the beneficiary not receive the disposition
in situations which involve wrongdoing by the beneficiary will be protected by the public
policy which prevents such beneficiaries from profiting by their wrongdoing. See, e.g.,
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (murderer of testator deprived of any
interest in the estate, either as beneficiary or heir).
60. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
61. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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but rather used the terms interchangeably.2 The directive of
EPTL 3-3.2 that a disposition to a witness is void can therefore
be given effect either by striking the disposition from the will or
by treating the witness as having immediately predeceased the
testator. In most situations, both methods of application pro-
duce the same result; in two situations, however, the results of
each method are different: if the witness is an issue or sibling of
the testator, the anti-lapse statute would pass the disposition to
the issue of the witness if he is treated as predeceased but would
be inapplicable if the disposition is struck out;" and if the will
contains a substitutionary disposition in case the beneficiary
predeceases the testator, the substitutionary disposition applies
if the witness is treated as having predeceased but does not ap-
ply if the disposition is struck out." In both situations, the re-
sult obtained by treating the witness as having immediately pre-
deceased the testator better fulfills the primary legislative
purpose of the statute, to preserve the intent of the testator as
far as possible." This method of application also maintains the
minimum safeguards against inducement of fraud by destroying
the witness's personal interest under the will.6
B. Applying the Statute in Conjunction with a Disposition of
a Cotenancy
1. Types of Cotenancy
Three types of cotenancy are recognized in New York: ten-
ancy in common, joint tenancy, and tenancy by the entirety.6"
Tenancy in Common
In a tenancy in common, each cotenant has a distinct and
62. See notes 42-50 and accompanying text supra.
63. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
64. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra and text accompanying note 60
supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 53 & 61 supra.
67. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 6-2.1 (McKinney 1967). A fourth type, the
tenancy in coparcenary, existed at common law as a corollary to the English rule of pri-
mogeniture. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 235-36 (1962).
See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.7 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
NrARizs *187-91; 4 J. KENT, CoMMFNTARS *366-67. Since primogeniture was never in
17
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separate interest in the property. 8 The only unity is that of pos-
session. 9 Each cotenant's interest is alienable and descendible. 70
There is no right of survivorship; 1 if one cotenant in common
dies after the estate is vested, the decedent's share passes to his
estate.7 1 A tenancy in common, however, creates no rights before
it is vested. Thus, if one co-beneficiary of a tenancy in common
created by will dies before the testator, the share of the deceased
co-beneficiary does not pass to his estate or to the surviving co-
force in the United States, estates in coparcenary were not generally recognized. C. Moy-
NIHAN, supra, at 236. This tenancy has now been absorbed by the tenancy in common. 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.7 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *367;
C. MOYNIHAN, supra, at 236.
Although tenancies in common and joint tenancies may include two or more coten-
ants, for simplicity the discussion herein will be limited to tenancies with two cotenants,
one of whom is an attesting witness. Additional cotenants would not change the result.
68. See, e.g., Chittenden v. Gates, 18 A.D. 169, 172, 45 N.Y.S. 768, 770 (2d Dep't
1897); Berlin v. Herbert, 48 Misc. 2d 393, 395, 265 N.Y.S.2d 25, 28 (Dist. Ct. Nassau
County 1965); Kristel v. Steinberg, 188 Misc. 500, 514, 69 N.Y.S.2d 476, 491 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. N.Y. County 1947); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *191; 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *368; 5A WARREN'S
WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Tenancy in Common §§ 1.02, 7.03 (1979).
In contrast to joint tenants, see note 77 and accompanying text infra, and tenants
by the entirety, see note 85 and accompanying text infra, tenants in common are said to
be seised per my but not per tout, by the half, or moiety, but not by all. 4 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES *368. The interests of tenants in common may therefore be unequal. C.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 224.
69. See, e.g., Jemzura v. Jemzura, 36 N.Y.2d 496, 503, 369 N.Y.S.2d 400, 407-08, 330
N.E.2d 414, 419 (1975); In re Estate of Moore, 16 A.D.2d 697, 698, 227 N.Y.S.2d 820, 823
(2d Dep't 1962); Chittenden v. Gates, 18 A.D. 169, 172, 45 N.Y.S. 768, 770 (2d Dep't
1897); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *191-92; 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *367; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at
224; 5A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Tenancy in Common §
1.02, 2.02 (1979).
70. See, e.g., Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N.Y. 306, 323-25, 84 N.E. 75, 81-82 (1908); 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *368;
C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 224; 5A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY Tenancy in Common § 7.03 (1979).
71. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *194; 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *368; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at
224; 5A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Tenancy in Common § 1.02
(1979).
72. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); C. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 67, at 224.
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beneficiary but lapses .7
Joint Tenancy
In a joint tenancy, the cotenants own the one interest to-
gether under a legal fiction of unity of the persons as co-own-
ers.74 Joint tenants must hold under a four-fold unity: interest,
title, time and possession.7 5 There is a right of survivorship; each
cotenant has an interest in the whole, and, on the death of one,
the decedent's interest disappears, and the whole estate contin-
ues in the survivor. 78 The fictional unity of the parties is ignored
for some purposes, and the cotenants are recognized as having
individual rights, 7 but the right of survivorship, based on the
73. Downing v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. 366, 373 (1861).
74. See, e.g., Moore Lumber Co. v. Behrman, 144 Misc. 291, 292, 259 N.Y.S. 248,
249-50 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. N.Y. County 1932); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMNrARIS *182; 4 J. KENT, CoMmENrrAnmS
*359; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 216-17; 2A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY Joint Tenants § 1.04 (1980).
75. See, e.g., In re Estate of Horler, 180 A.D. 608, 612, 168 N.Y.S. 221, 223 (1st
Dep't 1917); Moore Lumber Co. v. Behrman, 144 Misc. 291, 292, 259 N.Y.S. 248, 249-50
(N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. N.Y. County 1932); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *180; C. MoYIHAN, supra note 67, at 217;
2A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Joint Tenants § 1.05 (1980).
76. See, e.g., In re Estate of McKelway, 221 N.Y. 15, 19, 116 N.E. 348, 349 (1917);
In re Estate of Rushak, 28 A.D.2d 807, 807-08, 281 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941 (4th Dep't 1967);
In re Estate of Costello, 147 Misc. 629, 634, 265 N.Y.S. 905, 910 (Sur. Ct. Broome County
1933); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
CoMMENTARIES *183-84; 4 J. KENT, CoMuzNrAlEs *360; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at
220; 2A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Joint Tenants § 1.03 (1980).
The right of survivorship may be destroyed by severance of the joint tenancy. See note
77 infra; cf. note 88 and accompanying text infra (right of survivorship in tenancy by the
entirety is indestructible).
77. See, e.g., In re Lorch's Estate, 33 N.Y.S.2d 157, 165-66 (Sur. Ct. Queens County
1941); 2 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 4 J. KENT, COMmzNrrA-
pIS *359-60; C. MoYsIAN, supra note 67, at 217.
The combination of individual rights and fictional unity is the basis of the maxim
that, in contrast to tenants in common, see note 68 and accompanying text supra, and
tenants by the entirety, see note 85 and accompanying text infra, joint tenants are seised
per my et per tout, by the half, or moiety, and by all. See, e.g., In re Estate of Mc-
Kelway, 221 N.Y. 15, 19, 116 N.E. 348, 349 (1917); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *182; 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
*359; C. MOYIHAN, supra note 67, at 217.
An example of the individual rights of joint tenants is the ability of one cotenant to
alienate his separate interest. See, e.g., In re Estate of McKelway, 221 N.Y. 15, 19, 116
N.E. 348, 349 (1917); In re Estate of Cotter, 159 Misc. 324, 327, 287 N.Y.S. 670, 674 (Sur.
Ct. Kings County 1936); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 W.
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unity of the parties, is the dominant element of the tenancy. 78
As early as 1752, it was well settled that when one co-beneficiary
of a joint tenancy created by will dies before the testator, the
surviving co-beneficiary takes the whole estate .7 The right of
survivorship is so applied in New York, even if the gift fails as to
one co-beneficiary for a cause other than death."
Tenancy by the Entirety
Tenancy by the entirety is a special form of cotenancy avail-
able only to a husband and wife." In New York, it is also limited
to estates in real property.8 2 Tenants by the entirety own the
one interest together under a legal fiction of unity as husband
and wife." As in the joint tenancy, there is a right of survivor-
ship; each cotenant has an interest in the whole, and on the
death of one, the decedent's interest disappears, and the whole
estate continues in the survivor."
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *185; 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *363; C. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 67, at 221; 2A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Joint Tenants §
1.04 (1980). Such alienation severs the joint tenancy and creates a tenancy in common
between the transferee and the nontransferring cotenant. See, e.g., In re Estate of Mc-
Kelway, 221 NY. 15, 19, 116 N.E. 348, 349 (1917); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *185; 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
*363; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 221; 2A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY Joint Tenants § 1.03 (1980). The severance thus destroys the right of survi-
vorship of both original tenants. See, e.g., In re Estate of McKelway, 221 N.Y. 15, 19, 116
N.E. 348, 349 (1917).
78. See, e.g., In re Lorch's Estate, 33 N.Y.S.2d 157, 166 (Sur. Ct. Queens County
1941); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 4 J. KENT, COMMENTA-
RIES *360; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 220; 2A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY Joint Tenants § 1.03 (1980).
79. Humphrey v. Tayleur, 27 Eng. Rep. 89, 90 (Ch. 1752).
80. Downing v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. 366, 373 (1861). See note 130 and accompanying
text infra.
81. See, e.g., Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Thuna, 36 Misc. 2d 742, 744, 233
N.Y.S.2d 753, 755 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952); C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 229; 5A WARREN'S WEED NEW
YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Tenancy by Entirety §§ 1.01, 1.08 (1979).
82. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRusTS LAW § 6-2.1(4) (McKinney 1967).
83. See, e.g., Stelz v. Shreck, 128 N.Y. 263, 266, 28 N.E. 510, 511 (1891); In re Estate
of Price, 56 Misc. 2d 774, 775, 290 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1968); 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *362;
C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 229; 5A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY Tenancy by Entirety § 1.01 (1979).
84. See, e.g., Stelz v. Shreck, 128 N.Y. 263, 266, 28 N.E. 510, 511 (1891); In re
Maguire, 251 A.D. 337, 339, 296 N.Y.S. 528, 531 (2d Dep't 1937), affd, 277 N.Y. 527, 13
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Although at common law tenants by the entirety were not
recognized as possessing any individual interests,65 New York
treats the modern tenancy by the entirety as a tenancy in com-
mon with an indefeasible right of survivorship.a6 Thus, either
spouse may transfer his right to possession together with his
contingent right of survivorship. But in New York, as under
the common law, a tenancy by the entirety can be severed
against the will of one cotenant only by dissolution of the mar-
riage; the right of the surviving spouse to the entire estate can-
not be defeated by any transfer, voluntary or involuntary, by the
other spouse."
As noted above,'s when one co-beneficiary of a joint tenancy
created by will dies before the testator, the surviving co-benefi-
ciary takes the whole estate. Since this rule is applied to joint
tenancies despite the destructibility of the joint tenants' rights
of survivorship,90 the rule should also extend to tenancies by the
N.E.2d 458 (1938); In re Estate of Price, 56 Misc. 2d 774, 775, 290 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212
(Sur. Ct. Suffolk Country 1968); 2 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6. (A.J. Casner ed.
1952); 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARS *362; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 230; 5A WARREN'S
WEED NEW YoRK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Tenancy by Entirety § 1.07 (1979). In contrast
to the joint tenancy right of survivorship, see note 76 supra, the right of survivorship in
a tenancy by the entirety is indestructible. See note 88 and accompanying text infra.
85. See, e.g., Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 312, 39 N.E. 337, 338 (1895); 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 4 J. Kwr, CoMENTARm *362-63; C.
MOYNmAN, supra note 67, at 229. In contrast to joint tenants, see note 77 and accompa-
nying text supra, and tenants in common, see note 68 and accompanying text supra,
tenants by the entirety are said to be seised per tout but not per my, by all but not by
the half, or moiety. See, e.g., 2 AMmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
4 J. KENT, COMMENTARES *362; C. MOYNIAN, supra note 67, at 229; 5A WARREN'S WEED
NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Tenancy by Entirety § 1.07 (1979).
86. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Village of Otego, 216 N.Y. 112, 117, 110 N.E. 162, 164
(1915); Henner v. State, 32 Misc. 2d 333, 335, 224 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422 (Ct. Cl. 1962); C.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 234; 5A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
Tenancy by Entirety § 1.06 (1979).
87. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Village of Otego, 216 N.Y. 112, 116, 110 N.E. 162, 164
(1915); First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Lewis, 14 A.D.2d 150, 154, 218 N.Y.S.2d 857,
861 (2d Dep't 1961); Lawriw v. City of Rochester, 14 A.D.2d 13, 15, 217 N.Y.S.2d 113,
114 (4th Dep't 1961), affd, 11 N.Y.2d 759, 226 N.Y.S.2d 695, 181 N.E.2d 631 (1962); C.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 234; 5A WARRzN'S WEED NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
Tenancy by Entirety § 3.02 (1979).
88. See, e.g., DeGolyer v. Schutt, 40 A.D.2d 943, 943-44, 339 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (4th
Dep't 1972); C. MOYIHAN, supra note 67, at 229-30, 234; 5A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Tenancy by Entirety §§ 1.07, 3.02, 3.05 (1979).
89. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 77 supra.
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entirety, in which the rights of survivorship are indestructible. 1
2. Voiding the Interest of a Cotenant
In a tenancy in common, the manner in which EPTL 3-3.2
voids the interest of the witness, either by treating the witness
as having predeceased the testator or by striking the disposition
to the witness from the will, is largely immaterial. The interest
passes by an applicable substitutionary provision or falls into
the estate. Since the interest of the witness is separate and
alienable,' 2 the interest of the unblemished primary co-benefi-
ciary9s is not affected; the substitutionary beneficiary becomes
the cotenant of the unblemished primary co-beneficiary.
The proper method of application of the statute is not clear,
however, when one co-beneficiary of a disposition in the form of
a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety is a witness to the
will. The disposition to the witness is void," but the legislative
intent to preserve the testator's wishes requires that the disposi-
tion to the unblemished co-beneficiary remain unaffected. 5
Since the cotenants own the one interest together under a legal
fiction of unity of the persons," it is impossible to void the in-
terest of one co-beneficiary without affecting the other co-
beneficiary.
Because of the complications introduced by the cotenant's
interest in the whole and contingent right of survivorship, there
are four possible methods of applying the statute to joint tenan-
cies and tenancies by the entirety. The Unitary Approach
would void the entire disposition, destroying the interest of both
primary co-beneficiaries; this approach is the equivalent of strik-
ing the entire disposition from the will. The Substitutionary Ap-
proach would allow the substitutionary beneficiary s to step into
91. The effect of the death, before the testator, of one co-beneficiary of a tenancy by
the entirety created by will has not been judicially determined in New York.
92. See notes 68 & 70 and accompanying text supra.
93. The "unblemished" primary co-beneficiary is the co-beneficiary who is not an
attesting witness to the will.
94. N.Y. EST., PowERS & TRusTs LAw § 3-3.2 (McKinney 1967).
95. Du Bois v. Brown, 1 Dem. Sur. 317, 329 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1882),
aff'd sub noma. In re Brown, 31 Hun 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. Term 2d Dep't 1883).
96. See notes 74 & 83 and accompanying text supra.
97. The terminology for these four approaches is the author's.
98. For convenience, the term "substitutionary beneficiary" is used to denote the
[Vol. 1:473
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the shoes of the witness as cotenant of the intended tenancy
with the unblemished primary co-beneficiary; this approach is
one way of striking the disposition from the will only as it re-
lates to the witness. The Severance Approach would treat the
witness as having alienated his interest, thus severing the ten-
ancy, and would pass the disposition to the substitutionary
beneficary and the unblemished primary co-beneficiary as te-
nants in common; this approach is another way of striking the
disposition from the will only as it relates to the witness. The
Survivorship Approach would treat the witness as having prede-
ceased the testator and thereby pass the entire property to the
unblemished primary co-beneficiary.
Each of these approaches will be examined in terms of pro-
tection against fraud, preservation of the testator's intent, and
compatibility with the property law concepts of the different
types of cotenancy to determine which best fulfills the legislative
purpose of EPTL 3-3.2.
All four approaches provide complete protection against di-
rect inducement to testify fraudulently which might result from
the witness's interest. The Unitary Approach provides a further
protection against the indirect inducement which might result
from the interest of the co-beneficiary, particularly if the co-
beneficiary is closely tied to the witness. 9  The statute has never
attempted to reach any indirect interests; a disposition made di-
rectly to the unblemished co-beneficiary would clearly be good,
even if that co-beneficiary were the spouse or issue of the wit-
ness.100 Thus, while the Unitary Approach provides the maxi-
mum protection, all the approaches provide at least the level of
protection required by the statute.
The Unitary Approach
The Unitary Approach, which voids the entire disposition
and thereby destroys the interest of both primary co-benefi-
alternate taker, whether under a substitutionary disposition, under a residuary disposi-
tion, or in intestacy.
99. Protection against such indirect inducement to fraud could be particularly rele-
vant in a tenancy by the entirety, in which the co-beneficiary must be the witness's
spouse. This additional protection of the Unitary Approach sweeps too broadly, however,
as it would also void the interest of a totally unrelated co-beneficiary in a joint tenancy.
100. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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ciaries, views the disposition as intended by the testator to cre-
ate a single interest in the cotenants together. Since the testator
intended to create a unitary interest, no part of the testamen-
tary scheme can be preserved. But one can also view a disposi-
tion of a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety as intended
to give an interest in the whole, coupled with a contingent right
of survivorship, to each cotenant.101 Voiding the interest of the
witness defeats part of the testamentary intent but does not re-
quire defeating the entire scheme by voiding the interest of the
unblemished co-beneficiary as well. 102 The testator, after all,
made no attempt to condition the gift to one co-beneficiary on
the ability of the other to share; for example, if one co-benefi-
ciary actually predeceased the testator, the other would receive
the entire disposition.103 As the primary legislative purpose of
the interested witness statute is to preserve the testator's intent
as far as possible, '" another method of application which pre-
serves at least part of the unblemished co-beneficiary's interest
would be preferable.
The Unitary Approach seems to conform to the property
law concepts underlying both the joint tenancy, in which the co-
tenants hold under a legal fiction of unity as co-owners,105 and
the tenancy by the entirety, in which the cotenants hold under a
legal fiction of unity as husband and wife.106 Each joint tenant,
however, has individual, as well as joint, rights;107 the Unitary
Approach ignores and destroys these individual rights of the un-
blemished co-beneficiary. Furthermore, the primary effect of the
fictional unity of the cotenants in both tenancies is to create a
101. This view of the testamentary intent conforms to the property law concepts of
the joint tenancy and the tenancy by the entirety. See notes 76 & 84 and accompanying
text supra.
102. It is a canon of testamentary construction that if an invalid part can be ex-
punged without destroying the general testamentary scheme, the valid parts of the will
should be upheld. See, e.g., In re Will of Eveland, 284 N.Y. 64, 74, 29 N.E.2d 471, 474
(1940); Kalish v. Kalish, 166 N.Y. 368, 375, 59 N.E. 917, 919 (1901); In re Estate of Pace,
93 Misc. 2d 969, 976, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 493 (Sur. Ct. Cayuga County 1970); 6 WARREN'S
WEED NEW YORK LAW OP RaAL PROPERTY Wills § 10.08 (1978).
103. See notes 79-80 & 91 and accompanying text supra.
104. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
105. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
106. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
107. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
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right of survivorship in each cotenant;0 8 the Unitary Approach
destroys this right in the unblemished co-beneficiary. Finally,
the modern concept of the tenancy by the entirety in New York
ignores the fictional unity of the parties and treats the interest
as a tenancy in common with an indefeasible right of survivor-
ship.10 The Unitary Approach is clearly inapplicable to the ten-
ancy in common, in which each cotenant has only a separate in-
terest, 10 and is therefore also inapplicable to the modern
tenancy by the entirety."' Since the Unitary Approach is only
applicable to joint tenancies, and then only by ignoring the joint
tenant's individual rights and right of survivorship, adoption of
this approach would not permit a uniform rule for all types of
cotenancy.
The Substitutionary Approach
The Substitutionary Approach would allow the substitu-
tionary beneficiary to step into the shoes of the witness as coten-
ant, without altering the nature of the tenancy. This approach
may seem to preserve the testator's intent as to the unblemished
primary co-beneficiary, since the nature of the cotenancy would
be maintained. The co-beneficiary's interests would, neverthe-
less, be affected to some extent; the disposition was made in the
form of a cotenancy with the original co-beneficiaries in mind.
Substituting a stranger for one of the co-beneficiaries alters this
basic relationship and, in many cases, would produce a result
vastly different from that intended by the testator."' For exam-
ple, the resulting cotenants might be incompatible in terms of
their personalities or intended use of the gift; or the life expec-
tancy of the substituted cotenant might be very different from
108. See notes 78 & 84 and accompanying text supra.
109. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
110. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
111. The inapplicability of the Unitary Approach to tenancies by the entirety is par-
ticularly important in evaluating this approach, since it is primarily in the context of a
tenancy by the entirety that voiding the interest of both co-beneficiaries would remove
indirect inducements to testify fraudulently. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
Applied only to joint tenancies, the approach sweeps away far too much of the testator's
intent for a minimal increase in protection against fraud.
112. The relationship between the original cotenants is particularly close in a ten-
ancy by the entirety; the cotenants must be husband and wife. See note 81 and accompa-
nying text supra.
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that of the witness, thus altering the value of the unblemished
primary co-beneficiary's right of survivorship in a joint tenancy.
The Substitutionary Approach therefore fails to preserve fully
the testator's intent as to the unblemished primary co-
beneficiary.
The Substitutionary Approach is consistent with the prop-
erty law concepts of the tenancy in common. The interest of a
tenant in common is alienable; 113 the result of such alienation
can be viewed as substitution of the transferee as tenant in com-
mon with the original cotenant.1 4 This approach does not con-
form to the property law concepts of the joint tenancy; substitu-
tion of parties within a joint tenancy is impossible.115 The
Substitutionary Approach is also incompatible with the property
law concepts of the modern tenancy by the entirety.11 6 Although
one tenant by the entirety may transfer his right to possession
and his contingent right of survivorship, the measuring lives for
survivorship remain those of the original cotenants.11 7 Substitu-
tion would require that the measuring lives for survivorship be
those of the resulting cotenants.11 a
113. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
114. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 224. But see 5A WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Tenancy in Common § 7.03 (1979), which characterizes the re-
sult of alienating the interest of one tenant in common as termination of the tenancy and
creation of a new tenancy in common between the resulting cotenants. Both explanations
are valid. The only unity required for a tenancy in common is that of possession. See
note 69 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, the current possession by the resulting
cotenants may be viewed as the basis of a new tenancy in common, or the transfer of
possession to the transferee cotenant may be viewed as a continuation of the original
tenancy.
115. If one party in a joint tenancy transfers his interest while living, the result is
severance of the joint tenancy and creation of a tenancy in common between the result-
ing cotenants. See note 77 supra. An attempted transfer at death fails; the right of survi-
vorship means that the surviving cotenant owns the sole interest from the moment of
death. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
116. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
117. See, e.g., Lawriw v. City of Rochester, 14 A.D.2d 13, 15, 217 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114
(4th Dep't 1961), affd, 11 N.Y.2d 759, 226 N.Y.S.2d 695, 181 N.E.2d 631 (1962); 5A
WARREN'S WEED New YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY Tenancy by Entirety § 3.02 (1979).
118. Alternatively, the Substitutionary Approach could be viewed as acting on the
disposition before it becomes effective. Thus viewed, the approach would conform to the
property law concepts of the joint tenancy; the substitutionary beneficiary and the un-
blemished primary co-beneficiary would be the original cotenants. Nevertheless, this ap-
proach fails to recognize the essential characteristic of the tenancy by the entirety. that
it is available only to cotenants who are husband and wife. See note 81 and accompany-
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The Substitutionary Approach is inapplicable to joint ten-
ancies and tenancies by the entirety; therefore, adoption of this
approach would not permit a uniform rule for all types of
cotenancy.
The Severance Approach
The Severance Approach, by treating the witness as having
severed the tenancy, would pass the disposition to the unblem-
ished primary co-beneficiary and the substitutionary beneficiary
as tenants in common. This approach, like the Substitutionary
Approach,11 9 would substitute a stranger for one of the co-bene-
ficiaries selected by the testator, and would thereby frustrate the
testamentary intent as to the relationship between the unblem-
ished primary co-beneficiary and his cotenant. The frustration
produced by the Severance Approach would be far more signifi-
cant in a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety than that of
the Substitutionary Approach. The Severance Approach would
destroy the right of survivorship which the testator intended to
give to the unblemished primary co-beneficiary.
The Severance Approach is compatible with the property
law concepts of the tenancy in common. The interest of a tenant
in common is alienable; 0 the result of such alienation can be
viewed as severance or dissolution of the tenancy and creation of
a new tenancy in common between the resulting cotenants."12
This approach also conforms to the property law concepts of the
joint tenancy. A joint tenant may sever the tenancy by transfer-
ring his interest; the transferee becomes a tenant in common
with the nontransferring cotenant.12 ' Application of the Sever-
ance Approach to joint tenancies, however, would conflict with
the rule stated in Downing v. Marshall,"'3 that when a joint ten-
ancy created by will fails as to one of the beneficiaries, because
he died before the testator, or "from any other cause than
death," the whole interest passes to the survivor.12 4 The Sever-
ing text supra.
119. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
120. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
121. See note 114 supra.
122. See note 77 supra.
123. Downing v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. 366 (1861).
124. Id. at 373. For discussion of this rule, see note 130 and accompanying text
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ance Approach does not conform to the property law concepts of
the tenancy by the entirety, which cannot be severed against the
will of one cotenant except by dissolution of the marriage. 125
Since the Severance Approach is inapplicable to tenancies
by the entirety, and conflicts with the rule of Downing v. Mar-
shall as to joint tenancies, adoption of this approach would not
permit a uniform rule for all types of cotenancy.
The Survivorship Approach
The Survivorship Approach, by treating the witness as hav-
ing immediately predeceased the testator, would pass the entire
property to the unblemished primary co-beneficiary of a joint
tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety;12 treating a witness who is
a co-beneficiary of a tenancy in common as having predeceased
the testator would cause the witness's one-half interest to
lapse. 12 7
The Survivorship Approach is the only approach which does
not adversely affect the interest of the unblemished primary co-
beneficiary of a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety. This
approach, by passing the property to the co-beneficiary, may
seem to give him a windfall, but cotenants of such tenancies
each have an interest in the whole coupled with a contingent
right of survivorship; treating the witness as having immediately
predeceased the testator gives no additional interest to the co-
beneficiary, but merely removes the cloud of the other's interest.
The interest of the unblemished co-beneficiary is increased in
value, but this quantitative change is minor compared to the
real windfall which the residuary beneficiaries or distributees
would receive if the witness's interest were passed to them. Fur-
thermore, this approach operates through the right of survivor-
infra.
125. Although in New York a tenant by the entirety can transfer his right of posses-
sion and contingent right of survivorship, this does not sever the tenancy or destroy the
right of survivorship of the cotenant. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
126. See notes 79-80 & 90-91 and accompanying text supra. The Survivorship Ap-
proach is so called because, in treating the witness as having immediately predeceased
the testator, it treats the unblemished primary co-beneficiary as the surviving
beneficiary.
127. See note 73 and accompanying text supra. The lapsed interest would pass to an
applicable substitutionary beneficiary or fall into the estate to pass by residuary gift or
in intestacy.
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ship, the distinguishing feature of the joint tenancy and the ten-
ancy by the entirety, which can fairly be implied as the primary
reason the disposition was made in this form. The Survivorship
Approach is therefore the most consistent with the testator's in-
tent as to joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety.
The Survivorship Approach is applied to a tenancy in com-
mon by causing the witness's one-half interest to lapse and pass
to the residuary beneficiaries or distributees. This result cor-
rectly reflects the testator's intent, in choosing a nonsurvivorship
tenancy, that the co-beneficiary should not receive the entire
property even on the death of the witness. The Survivorship Ap-
proach may adversely affect the interest of the unblemished pri-
mary co-beneficiary by replacing the cotenant selected by the
testator. The effect of such replacement is relatively minor in a
tenancy in common, however, since there is no right of survivor-
ship, 128 and each cotenant has the power to transfer his interest
to a stranger.12 9 Furthermore, no other approach better pre-
serves the testator's intent in the tenancy in common.
The Survivorship Approach conforms to the property law
concepts of all three types of cotenancy. The distinguishing fea-
ture of both the joint tenancy and the tenancy by the entirety is
the right of survivorship; the tenancy in common lacks this
right. The Survivorship Approach is applied to the former ten-
ancies through the right of survivorship; when applied to the lat-
ter tenancy, the absence of survivorship produces a different re-
sult. The Survivorship Approach is thus the only approach
which follows property law distinctions between the types of
cotenancy.
The Survivorship Approach is applicable to tenancies in
common, joint tenancies, and tenancies by the entirety; adoption
of this approach would therefore permit a uniform rule for all
types of cotenancy. Furthermore, the Survivorship Approach
may be required in joint tenancies. In 1861, the New York Court
of Appeals stated in dicta:
Where a devise or bequest to two or more persons by name is in
such form as to create a joint tenancy, and one of them dies
before the testator, it is well settled, that the whole interest vests
128. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
129. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
29
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:473
in the survivors; and this result will take place if the gift fails, as
to one of the persons from any other cause than death.18 0
This rule was also applied to a tenancy by the entirety in the
only New York case to consider directly the effect of EPTL 3-3.2
on a tenancy with a right of survivorship, In re Flynn.15 1
Finally, the Survivorship Approach is consistent with the
approach to substitutionary provisions for lapsed dispositions
developed in subsection A of this comment. Therefore, the Sur-
vivorship Approach allows creation of a uniform rule treating
the witness as having immediately predeceased the testator in
130. Downing v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. 366, 373 (1861) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
131. In re Flynn, 68 Misc. 2d 1087, 329 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County
1972). The testator in Flynn had devised her home to one of the attesting witnesses and
the witness's husband. Id. at 1088, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 250. The parties agreed that the
devise to the witness was rendered void by EPTL 3-3.2, but differed as to the effect of
voiding this disposition on the gift to the co-beneficiary. The objectant argued that a
disposition of real property to husband and wife creates a tenancy in the entirety under
EPTL 6-2.2(b); that such a disposition involves "an entirety of interest," and that sever-
ing the witness's interest rendered void the entire disposition. Id. The objectant's posi-
tion corresponds to the Unitary Approach, discussed at notes 100-111 and accompanying
text supra. The court rejected this approach on the ground that no tenancy by the en-
tirety ever came into existence. Id.
The Flynn court claimed that because the devise to the witness was void, "the lan-
guage of the devise must now be read as if her name were omitted entirely therefrom."
Id. at 1088, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 251. The quoted language seems to require application of
EPTL 3-3.2 by one of the approaches which involve striking out the disposition to the
witness, i.e. the Unitary Approach rejected by the court, the Substitutionary Approach,
or the Severance Approach. Yet the Flynn court did not use any of these approaches; it
applied the rule of Downing v. Marshall by analogy and held that the entire fee interest
vested solely in the co-beneficiary. Id. at 1089, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 251. This result corre-
sponds to the Survivorship Approach, the only approach which does not involve striking
out the disposition to the witness.
Flynn has been criticized by Patrick J. Rohan as defeating the policy behind EPTL
3-3.2. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRuSTs LAW § 3-3.2, commentary at 78 (McKinney Supp.
1980). In light of the discussion of the legislative policy of EPTL 3-3.2 above, see notes
23-33 and accompanying text supra, this criticism is unfounded. Passing the entire prop-
erty to the unblemished co-beneficiary maintains the statutory protection against direct
inducement to fraud by destroying the witness's personal interest. This approach does
not protect against the indirect inducement which may result from the interest of the co-
beneficiary, but the statute does not attempt to reach any indirect inducement. See note
28 and accompanying text supra.
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all applications of EPTL 3-3.2.
3. Conclusion Regarding Cotenancies
When EPTL 3-3.2 voids the interest of a witness in a dispo-
sition in the form of a cotenancy, the legislative purpose of the
statute requires that the interest of the unblemished co-benefi-
ciary be preserved as far as possible.13 2 This presents no problem
in a tenancy in common, since the interests of the cotenants are
separate and alienable. " 8 In a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the
entirety, however, the cotenants own the one interest together
under a legal fiction of unity of the persons," and it is impossi-
ble to void the interest of one cotenant without affecting the
other cotenant.
This comment has examined four possible methods of ap-
plying the statute to cotenancies. All four approaches provide
the full statutory protection against direct interests.3 3 The Uni-
tary Approach,'3 6 which would void the interests of both benefi-
ciaries, interferes far too broadly with the testator's intent and
cannot be applied to tenancies in common or tenancies by the
entirety. The Substitutionary Approach, "' which allows the sub-
stitutionary beneficiary to step into the shoes of the witness, in-
terferes with the testator's intent by changing the identity of the
unblemished primary co-beneficiary's cotenant, thereby affecting
the unblemished primary co-beneficiary's enjoyment of the gift
and the value of any contingent right of survivorship. This ap-
proach is also inapplicable to joint tenancies, in which substitu-
tion of a party severs the tenancy and destroys the right of sur-
vivorship, and to tenancies by the entirety, in which the
indefeasible right of survivorship prevents any change in the
measuring lives. The Severance Approach, 38 which treats the
witness as having severed the tenancy and passes the disposition
to the substitutionary beneficiary and the unblemished primary
co-beneficiary as tenants in common, results in the same inter-
132. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
133. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
134. See notes 74 & 83 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 99-100 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 101-111 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 112-118 and accompanying text supra.
138. See notes 119-125 and accompanying text supra.
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ference with the testator's intent as does the Substitutionary
Approach. Moreover, the Severance Approach is not applicable
to tenancies by the entirety, which cannot be severed except by
dissolution of the marriage. The Survivorship Approach, 8 9
which treats the witness as having immediately predeceased the
testator, is the only approach which both satisfies the legislative
purpose of EPTL 3-3.2 and is applicable to all types of
cotenancy.
The Survivorship Approach produces the least alteration in
the testamentary scheme when applied to a joint tenancy or a
tenancy by the entirety, since it merely removes the cloud of the
witness's interest from the interest in the whole already given to
the co-beneficiary. This approach also fulfills the testator's in-
tent by operating through the right of survivorship, the distinc-
tive feature of the joint tenancy and the tenancy by the entirety.
The Survivorship Approach may alter the relationship between
the cotenants of a tenancy in common, but no other approach
better preserves this testamentary scheme. This approach,
therefore, best fulfills the legislative purpose of EPTL 3-3.2 to
preserve the testator's wishes as far as possible while maintain-
ing the safeguards against direct inducement to fraud.
The Survivorship Approach is applicable to all types of co-
tenancy; it is the only approach which follows property law dis-
tinctions. Finally, the Survivorship Approach to cotenancies is
consistent with the approach to substitutionary provisions for
lapsed dispositions suggested in subsection A of this comment.
Therefore, the Survivorship Approach is suggested as the prefer-
able approach to the application of EPTL 3-3.2 to cotenancies.
III. Suggestions
The foregoing analysis of the situations in which the in-
tended effect of EPTL 3-3.2 is not clear leads to the conclusion
that the legislative purpose is best served by treating the witness
as having immediately predeceased the testator. Courts should
interpret the word "void" in EPTL 3-3.2 as interchangeable with
"lapsed" and give effect to the statute by treating the witness as
having immediately predeceased the testator, rather than by
139. See notes 126-131 and accompanying text supra.
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striking out the disposition. In most cases, either method will
produce the same result; when the results are different, the pur-
pose of the statute is better served by treating the witness as
predeceased.
The legislature should consider removing the uncertainty in
the application of EPTL 3-3.2 by amending the statute to spec-
ify that any disposition, or part thereof, to an attesting witness,
which is rendered void by this section, shall be given effect as
though the witness had immediately predeceased the testator.1, 0
Finally, draftsmen should avoid possible confusion as to the
applicability of a substitutionary disposition. Limitation of the
substitutionary disposition to situations in which the beneficiary
predeceases the testator raises the question whether the testator
intended the substitution to be made when the disposition is
rendered void by EPTL 3-3.2.1" 1 Instead of relying on the courts
to adopt the interpretation of the statute suggested above, a
draftsman can ensure applicability of the substitutionary dispo-
sition by using the phrase, "if he predecease me or if the disposi-
tion, or any part thereof, fails for any reason." Use of this word-
ing will produce a result in keeping with the testator's intent in
the situations discussed above and in any others not contem-
plated by the testator.14 2
IV. Conclusion
This comment's comparison of EPTL 3-3.2 with its statu-
tory and common-law antecedents shows that the legislature's
primary purpose in enacting the statute was to preserve the
wishes of the testator as far as possible while still protecting
against the inducement to give fraudulent testimony, for or
140. This method of application is already specified in several other sections of
EPTL. See, e.g., N.Y. EST., POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW §§ 2-1.11(b) (renunciation), 4-
1.4(b) (disqualification of parent), 5-1.4(a) (revocatory effect of divorce) (McKinney
Supp. 1980).
141. The standard substitutionary clause is phrased in terms of the beneficiary's
predeceasing, or not surviving, the testator. See, e.g., 2 E. FINGAR, D. BOOKSTAVER & J.
McQuAD, NEW YORK WILLS AND TRUSTS §§ 14:04:F03-04 (1980); 2 J. MURPHY, MURPHY'S
WELL CLAUSES, forms 12:35, 12:36A (1980).
142. The testator is already protected against application of the substitutionary pro-
vision in situations which involve wrongdoing by the beneficiary. See note 59 and accom-
panying text supra.
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against the will, which might result from a witness's personal in-
terest in the will. Neither the statute nor the common-law rule
has ever attempted to extend its protection to prevent induce-
ment resulting from interests of the witness's spouse or issue.
The statute declares that such dispositions are "void," but
does not specify whether this is to be effected by striking the
disposition from the will or by treating the witness as having
immediately predeceased the testator. In most cases, the effect is
the same under either method, but only the latter approach al-
lows application of EPTL 3-3.3 to prevent the lapse of a disposi-
tion to a witness who is an issue or sibling of the testator and to
pass the disposition to the surviving issue of such witness. Appli-
cation of this anti-lapse mechanism preserves the implied intent
of the testator to prefer the witness's issue to the residuary ben-
eficiaries or distributees. This approach maintains the primary
safeguard againt fraud by destroying the witness's personal in-
terest in the will; thus, the legislative purpose of EPTL 3-3.2 is
best served by treating the witness as predeceased.
Similarly, a substitutionary disposition in the event that the
beneficiary predeceases the testator carries the implication that
the testator would have intended the same result if the primary
disposition were voided by EPTL 3-3.2. Activation of the substi-
tutionary disposition does not affect the statutory safeguards
against fraud, since the witness's personal interest in the will re-
lates only to the primary disposition. Application of EPTL 3-3.2
by treating the witness as predeceased best serves the legislative
purpose in this situation as well.
Finally, a disposition in the form of a joint tenancy or a ten-
ancy by the entirety reflects a testamentary intent to give each
co-beneficiary an interest in the whole gift and a contingent
right of survivorship. Voiding the interest of the witness by
treating him as having immediately predeceased the testator ful-
fills this testamentary intent by preserving the interest of the
unblemished co-beneficiary through the mechanism of the right
of survivorship. This method, here called the Survivorship Ap-
proach, preserves the testamentary intent more fully than any
other method, without sacrificing any protection against direct
inducement to give fraudulent testimony. Thus, this method of
applying EPTL 3-3.2 to cotenancies best achieves the legislative
purpose of the statute.
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Application of EPTL 3-3.2 by treating the witness as prede-
ceased achieves the legislative purpose in all situations ex-
amined. In most cases, this method produces the same result as
the alternative methods; when the results differ, this application
best serves the legislative purpose.
Three recommendations are made on the basis of these
conclusions:
1. The courts should apply EPTL 3-3.2 by treating the witness
as having immediately predeceased the testator. At the very least,
this approach ought to be followed in the above-considered situa-
tions as necessary to the fulfillment of the legislative purpose.
2. The legislature should amend the statute to make clear that
this is the proper method of application.
3. Draftsmen should avoid confusion which may arise in the ap-
plication of substitutionary dispositions. Applicability of the sub-
stitutionary disposition to the situations discussed above can be
ensured by changing the standard activating phrase to read "if he
predecease me or if the disposition, or any part thereof, fails for
any other reason."
Gregory E. Koster
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